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The Federal Constitution clearly guarantees the right "to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."' Yet, judicial decisions
construing this guarantee are strikingly rare and there is little doctrinal
or scholarly exploration of what, if anything, such a right ought to
entail.2 To be sure, virtually any legal claim premised on denial of the
right to petition for redress of grievances seems merely to overlap with
more familiar, "cognate" First Amendment rights such as freedom
of expression and assembly.3 Moreover, the citizenry in the United
States have been comparatively free to seek redress throughout most
of our history.4 And the constitutional guarantee is phrased in terms
of seeking redress; it certainly does not seem to guarantee actually
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 For a fine recent exception, see Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The Histoy
and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAm L. REv. 2153 (1998).
3 In Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141 (1966), for example, in the course of invalidating
a conviction for a silent protest against the segregation of a public librar); Justice Fortas's plurality
opinion described "an aspect of a basic constitutional right-the right [of] speech and of
assembly, and freedom to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." He went on to
assert that these rights "are not confined to verbal expression." Id. at 142. The right to petition
for redress of grievances figured more prominently later the same year injustice Douglas's dissent
in Adderley v. Floida, 385 U.S. 39, 49 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas, joined by Chief
justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Fortas, objected to the majority's decision to uphold
the convictions of 32 college students for protesting outside a local Florida jail where their
colleagues were incarcerated for demonstrating against racial segregation. See id. Quoting the
Magna Carta, Douglas described a right with "an ancient history," essential for those without
funds or clout enough to use more regular channels to reach government officials, and not to
be trumped by a peaceful trespass on public property. See id.; see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 529-30 (1945) (describing "cognate rights" of freedom of speech, press, peaceable assembly
and petition for redress of grievances as "inseparable"); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307
U.S. 496, 512-13 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring, with whom Black, J., joined and with whol
Hughes, C.J., concurred in part) (identifying national privileges and immunities of citizenship
with right to petition Congress for redress of grievances).
4 The most famous exception was the Gag Rule in the 1830s and early 1840s, with wlsich
Congress simply refused to accept antislavery petitions. See generally 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING,
THE ROAD TO DISUNtON: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY, 1776-1854, at 289-352 (1990).
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obtaining redress. In our highly legalistic culture, however, it is appro-
priately difficult to ignore the basic claim that clear legal wrongs ought
to have remedies. 5
The excellent articles presented by Professors Chris Iijima, Robert
Westley and Eric Yamamoto offer eloquent analyses of the pluses and
minuses within diverse claims for reparations. They make thoughtful
and hardheaded suggestions regarding various possible audiences for
such claims. All three authors underscore the huge importance of re-
membering official sins of the past, yet they also suggest the difficulty in
convincing anyone to do anything toward beginning to make amends.
Beyond the obvious political difficulties and the need to overcome the
remarkable ahistoricism of most Americans, those who seek redress
must confront the fundamental presentist supposition that dominates
our nation. The prevailing presumption is that somehow, sometime-
perhaps when we weren't paying attention-sufficient justice and
equality came to prevail. Therefore, it is assumed, we all now enjoy an
equal, fair start in the cosmic race of life. We hold tightly to this credo
as if it were self-evident, no matter what the actual evidence may be.
At the end of this often-horrific century, to define reality with this
baseless leap of faith seems particularly parochial, though this very leap
dominates contemporary discourse in the United States.
Throughout the world today, however, people are seeking to for-
mulate mechanisms to deal with the vast array of collective horrors of
the recent past. As Martha Minow illuminates with great insight, bal-
ance and compassion in her latest book, nations and individuals are
currently probing for new paths between vengeance and forgiveness.6
By such means as war crimes tribunals, truth and reconciliation com-
missions, reparations and an array of innovative living memorials,
there is a fundamental quest to right wrongs despite the clear under-
standing, shared by many, that the lasting impact of mass violence and
collective persecution can never be truly remedied. It is also significant
and fitting that these efforts proceed despite the lack of some clear-cut
benchmark established in the past. This benchmark problem is an
issue in the United States as well, but it is not, I maintain, an insur-
mountable obstacle.
5 "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to clahn
the protection of the laws, whenever ie receives an injury.... [The] government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease
to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right." Marbury %v Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
6 See MIARTHA NINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTERt
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
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A. No Baseline, No Nunc Pro Tunc
The basic problem: Now is now, then was then, and now and then
won't do. There can be no convincing nunc pro tunc ("now for then,"
a commonplace common law fiction), no persuasive legal fiction able
to "roll back the tide of time. '7 To right past wrongs and to make
victims, or the descendants of victims, whole again is deeply problem-
atic for many reasons. Not the least of these is the impossibility of defin-
ing a baseline and holding to it, as if it were flash frozen, throughout
subsequent changes. We are aware that the world is full of contingen-
cies, and we cannot ignore multivariable causation that is the compli-
cated stuff of good fiction, great history and chaos theory. Remem-
brance may be the essential key to redemption,8 but redemption does
not necessarily-nor even probably--entail going back.
It is painfully true that, at least in this life, "You Can't Go Home
Again."9 Even happy endings in classic myths and fairy tales do not
deny this harsh truth. By the time Odysseus reaches Ithaca, for exam-
pie, his hunting dogs do not recognize him. Along with Penelope and
Telemachus, Odysseus and Ithaca can never be fully restored. They
may be better for the transformation, but their old standard cannot
hold. And in The Wizard of Oz, Dorothy might learn that there is no
place like home, but perceptive members of the audience know that
somehow both Dorothy and Kansas have changed forever.
7 Hall v. United States, 92 U.S. 27, 30 (1875). In Naeoman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Lan-ain, 490
U.S. 826, 840 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), for example, Justice Kennedy, joined in dissent
byJustice Scalia, observed, "[t]lhe charming utility of the nunc pro tunc device cannot obscure
its outright fiction." The dissenters objected to the majority's willingness to allow federal appellate
courts to use Rule 21 of te Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss dispensable non-diverse
parties in order, retroactively, to assure proper diversityjurisdiction. See id. at 839. In Hall, the
unanimous Court defined its duty to be to "roll back the tide of time, and to imagine" one's self
back in Mississippi before abolition. 92 U.S. at 30. Having performed this feat of mental gymnas-
tics, the Justices found it easy to deny a claim by a former slave to a share of cotton from the
plantation on which he toiled, because everyone knew that slaves could not contract or own
property in Mississippi before abolition. See id. at 31.
8 This statement by the Ba'al Shem Toy is on the wall ofYad Vashem, the Holocaust memorial
in Jerusalem. For a fine modern biograph; see MOSHE RosmAN, FOUNDER OF HASIDISM: A QUEST
FOR THE HISTORICAL BA'AL SHEM Toy (1996).
9 THOMAS WOLFE, YOU CAN'T Go HOME AGAIN (1940). Perhaps the fact that Wolfe was two
years dead when his much-pared-down novel was published underscores the point. The Supreme
Court clearly has had difficulty recently in sorting out retrospective and prospective relief in the
context of federal courts and the Eleventh Amendment, for example. See, e.g., Idaho v. Couer
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996); Carlos Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospec-
live-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctfine, 87 GEo. LJ. 1 (1998).
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Provoked in the best sense by all three of these examples of
first-rate legal scholarship, I will use this brief comment to focus on
basic conceptual challenges that lurk within any effort to obtain legal
or political redress for massive past depredations. Notwithstanding
Justice Holmes's words,10 I agree with these three authors that activists
and government officials, advocates and judges all ought to pursue
justice for past wrongs despite the full knowledge thatjustice can never
be achieved fully. The same message may be even more important for
everyone else. After all, redress almost surely must have grass-roots
support to take hold effectively.
My argument is twofold. First, I claim that we should give special
attention to the broad, open-ended promises of the past. We ought to
do this not because those promises are specifically binding, but rather
with acceptance of such promises as visionary-and even as changeable
over time. Great past promises are thus to be understood partially as
hortatory, yet also partly as binding upon the future. Second, and
perhaps still more controversially, I maintain that there is some hope
for progress after all. To realize that hope, it may be necessary to
stretch analysis beyond the kind of equity familiar to lawyers and
philosophers.
By expanding the boundaries of traditional analysis, we begin to
move through the usual confines of legal justice to more contextual
righteousness. Paradoxically, the very absence of a clear baseline ren-
ders use of the normative imagination more frightening and, perhaps,
more accessible than most legal discourse. Enforcing old visionary
words may appeal to people in venues far removed from the marble
courtrooms that exist, at least in our imaginations, to dispense equal
justice under law. This approach may help redeem key elements of the
promise of America.
B. "A promissory note to which every American was to fall heir' 1
In the course of his soaring "I Have a Dream" speech at the March
on Washington in August of 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. declared
"the fierce urgency of now.' 2 The trope that King used to illustrate this
10 Holnes delighted in denying that justice had anything to do with the work of theJustices,
and lie said so often. I quoted and discussed several characteristically pithy Holmuesian examples,
and some of the scholarly discussion about them that has ensued, in AVIAI SOIFER, LAW AND
THE COMPANY WtE KEEP (1995).
11 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), in LENWOOD G. DAVIS, I HAVE
A DREAM: THE LIFE AND TIIEs OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 261 (1969).
' Id. (emphasis added).
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point, however, was mundane as well as visionary. He proclaimed that
hundreds of thousands of marchers had arrived in Washington that
sweltering day "to cash a check.' 3 King elaborated:
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent
words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, they were signing a promissory note to which every
American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all
men [yes, black men as well as white men] would be guaran-
teed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.' 4
In fact, King noted that instead of honoring "this sacred obligation,"
the check had been returned to the Negro people marked "in-
sufficient funds."15 But, he continued, "we refuse to believe that the
bank of justice is bankrupt."'6
King's image of a promissory note is noteworthy. When he sought
to particularize his compelling Dream, King did so somewhat inaccu-
rately in the language of everyday legalism. Images of "checks" and
"promissory notes" seemed both simple and serious, without much
need to reflect on the way the legal terms actually work in the world.
And King clearly also mythologized the historical promise that he
invoked. His blend of the Declaration of Independence and the Con-
stitution in support of civil rights, for example, hardly makes specific
sense historically.
In the tradition of Frederick Douglass, however, King reinter-
preted the core American stories of origin. 17 Douglass, who famously
declared that he could not celebrate Independence Day while slavery
continued, began to interpret the Constitution as an antislavery docu-
ment that, properly understood, imposed an ongoing duty on all
Americans to end slavery and to restore the "plundered rights" of those
who had been enslaved.' 8 Like Douglass, King discerned what the
promise of the founding documents ought to entail. In his soaring
13 Id.
14 Id.
Is Id.
"
6 King, supra note 11, at 261.
1 See Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV,. 2280
(1989).
18 SeetILLIAM S. McFEELY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 204-07 (1991). In Douglass's famous Fifth
of july Speech in 1852, which is "perhaps the greatest antislavery oration ever given," Douglass
insisted that "[t]he 4th of July is the first great fact in your nation's history-the very ring-bolt
in the chain of your yet undeveloped destiny." Id. at 173.
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words, "[t]his note was a promise that all men would be guaranteed
the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."' 9
This founding promise is ongoing. It has created a kind of constitu-
tional promissory estoppel-a promise enforceable beyond the usual
formalities of contract law by the very nature of its relational, largely
open-ended compulsion. The specific intention of the founders-who-
ever one includes in that group-is not determinative. The actions of
those who subsequently rely on and interpret the promise also count."
The reasonable possibilities that the original words helped to create
become crucial. That many people have relied to their great detriment
also has significance. Founding promises thus can constitute a differ-
ent kind of social contract, a contract that, over time, becomes a new
manifestation of America's destiny.
King also underscored the complexity of any genuine promise of
freedom-including the fundamental idea that true freedom entails
being bound to the destiny of others. For example, King praised whites
who "have come to realize that... their freedom is inextricably bound
to our freedom. We cannot walk alone."121 We are beginning to com-
prehend that victimizers and bystanders may also be victims, at least
through the shame of the lasting effects of past injustices.2 2 This, I
believe, was a major element of King's elaboration of the promise of
America and the appeal of his American Dream. It also might help
explain some of the power of King's oft-quoted invocation of the words
of the ancient prophet Amos: "[W] e will not be satisfied until justice
rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream. 23 This
19 King, supra note 11, at 261. See generally the recent symposium, Di. Martin Luther King's
Lfe in Proactive Engagement. The Lawyer as Social Activist in the Comm unity, 50 ALA. L. RE . 1
(1998) and, specifically, Blake D. Morant, The Teachings ofDr Martin Luther KingJ: and Contract
Theory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REv. 63 (1998).
'
0 For a somewhat similar approach in quite a different context, see Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casty, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 901 (1992) (O'ConnotJ., plurality opinion
joined by Kennedy, J. and SouterJ.) ("It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realn of
personal liberty which the government may not enter... Our Constitution is a covenant running
from the first generation of Americans to us and to fiture generations.").
21 King, supra note 11, at 262.
22 Judge Richard J. Goldstone of the South African Constitutional Court, who is also the
former Chief Prosecutor of de International Criminal Tribunals on the former Yugoslavia and
Ruanda, makes this point briefly but powerfully in his Foreword to MINOW, supra note 6, at xii.
Goldstone credits the playwright Ariel Dorfinan for pointing out to him that white South Africans
are also victims of apartheid, at least in that their discomfort with truth is their shame, which also
makes then victims. See id.
23 King, supra note 11, at 262. The demand that Amos made of the Jewish people, who had
grown soft and corrupt beneath their assumption that they were the chosen people, is tianslated
as: 
"[L] etjnstice well up as waters And righteousness as a mighty stream." THE TWELVE PRO HETS
107 (A. Cohen ed. & trans., Soncino Press 1948). Frederick Douglass also had invoked powerfil
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combination of threat and promise-and the distinction between jus-
tice and righteousness at which it hints-deserves more attention as it
pertains both to large issues of group redress and to the individual
choices in everyday life.
Powerful recognition of the ongoing responsibility for others-
even when one's own group has been horribly victimized-is one of
the most salient aspects of these articles. By exploring some subtle and
not-so-subtle costs of reparations, as well as a range of possible benefits,
Professors Iijima, Westley and Yamamoto have called upon us to raise
our eyes above the reports of appellate decisions. We can and should
enlarge our perspective beyond the supposed rugged individualism
that remains central to most American legal discourse. In so doing, all
three scholars have done us a great service, though they have not freed
us of responsibility.
C. Justice is a mode of action, righteousness a quality of the person. 24
It is well known that the Supreme Court struggled mightily in the
1950s to determine what might be constitutionally wrong with segre-
gation in the public schools. What the Justices should say and do about
the long-standing, pervasive evil of segregation seemed hardly self-evi-
dent. That the Court itself was implicated directly through its legitimi-
zation of the rise of Jim Crow and the stranglehold of racism com-
pounded the problem. The strikingly vague reach and limits of Brown
v. Board of Education5 -and of the desegregation decisions that fol-
lowed-is quite familiar. Less often noticed, however, is the way the
Court supported its claim that it would be "unthinkable" to have one
water imagery in his Fifth ofJuly Speech as he warned of the terrible consequences to the United
States were justice not done:
There is consolation in the thought that America is young. Great streams are not
easily turned from channels, worn deep in the course of ages. They may sometimes
rise in quiet and stately majesty, and inundate the land, refreshing and fertilizing
the earth with their mysterious properties. They may also rise in wrath and fury,
and bear away, on their angry uraves, tie accumulated wealth of years of toil and
hardship. They howeve; gradually flow back to the same old channel, and flow on
as serenely as ever. But, while the river may not be turned aside, it may dry up, and
leave nothing behind but the withered branch, and the unsightly rock, to howl in
abyss-sweeping wind, the sad tale of departed glor)y As with rivers so with nations.
MCFEELY, supra note 18, at 173.
24 ABRAHAMJ. HESCHEL, THE PROPHETS 201 (1969).
25347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court proclaimed implementation "withd all deliberate speed"
the following year, Brown v Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), and, of course,
Americans have been batting over desegregation and the relative color-blindness of the Consti-
tution ever since.
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rule about equality for the states and another for the federal govern-
ment. When Chief Justice Earl Warren tried to explain why Washing-
ton, D.C. could not maintain racially segregated public schools once
Brown was decided, he identified "our American ideal of fairness" as
the source for both equal protection and due process.26 It is instructive,
albeit hardly surprising, that such an explicit concept of fairness-per-
haps partially the product of Warren's personal guilt over his own
involvement in the internment tragedy-has not played a significant
role in constitutional law since 1954.
Dissenting in Romer v. Evans, for example, Justice Scalia excori-
ated the majority for its "heavy reliance upon principles of righteous-
ness rather than judicial holdings."27 This presumed disjunction be-
tween righteousness and the activity of judges is both commonplace
and telling. Justice Scalia bitterly remonstrated about the "terminal
silliness" of the majority's holding that a state may not deny legal
protection to a group because it is disfavored.2 8 Actually, however,
Romerrecognized something crucial when the majority proclaimed: "A
law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group
of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself
a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense."29
Denial of legal protection is itself injustice. This is so even without a
clear benchmark. In the context of past inequities, moreover, acts of
active righteousness are particularly necessary even to begin to provide
redress. Juster justice for all demands nothing less from all of us.
2 6 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Warren stated for the unanimous Court:
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not
contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which
applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process,
both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive.
The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited
unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two
are almays interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimina-
tion may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
Id.
27 517 U.S. 620,636 (1996) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (criticizing Court's invalidation of Colorado
constitutional amendment that prohibited all state and local government protection "based on
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation"). The first line of Scalia's unbridled cri de coeur is
the memorable charge: "The Court has mistaken a Kulturkamnpf for a fit of spite." Id. Beyond the
unfortunate connotations of this beginning, the remainder of the dissent is startling for its acerbic
passion. Observing that ChiefJustice Relnquist and justice Thomasjoined Scalia's opinion and
presumably tempered it somewhat, my student, David McCay, asked, "What did the first draft look
like?"
28 Id. at 639.
9Id. at 633.
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Aristotle defined equity as follows: "This is the essential nature of
the equitable: it is rectification of law where law is defective because of
its generality."30 What is at stake in reparations claims, as well as in
related restorative justice efforts, is significantly different from the
Aristotelian prescription. The key distinction may be that reparations
claims usually seem anchored in perceived defects in law when law is
not general enough.
Another problem inherent in relying on traditional legal proc-
esses is that the standard insistence on treating like cases alike tends
to miss entirely the suffering brought about by extraordinary wrong-
doing. This is the case whether the evil is banal, deep-seated or the
product of either private or public collective violence. Moreover, a legal
system that simply balances interests may prove too ready to accept any
justification that seems reasonable-even when a statement of benign
ends masks horrific means or balances away fundamental human dig-
nity.
It may be expecting too much of judges and of a regular legal
system to begin to make amends for drastic wrongs. It may also be
asking too much of popularly-elected officials in other branches of
government to attempt to afford justice to those who have suffered
grievous wrongs in the past. Excessive focus on what ends are just tends
to diminish attention to mundane, everyday needs. And the ability to
heed nuances and to look beyond the anecdotal is hardly a strength
of the legislative and executive branches with which we are familiar. It
is unclear, therefore, to what, if any, institution we should address the
petitions for redress of past wrongs.
Ultimately, it may be that the only way to begin to achieve justice
is to try to act righteously in the particularities of everyday life. This
helps explain why there is such power in Professor Iijima's riveting
account of his father's medals, earned in service for the fabled 442nd
Regimental Combat Team in World War II, and of his father's under-
standing of the need to fight for the rights of others during peacetime.
Doing the right thing because it is the right thing to do is a common
motif within the remarkable stories of those who sheltered Jews during
World War II despite extraordinary personal risk.31 As Martha Minow
30AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, EQUITY INJEWISH LAW BEYOND EQUITY: HALAKHIC ASPIRATION-
ISM IN JEWISH CIVIL LAWv xxiv (1991) (quoting Aristotle).
31 See, e.g., ENRICO DEAGLIO, THE BANALITY OF GOODNESS: THE STORY OF GIORGIO PERLASCA
(Gregory Conti trans., Notre Dame Press 1998); PHILIP PAUL HALLIE, LEST INNOCENT BLOOD BE
SHED: THE STORY OF THE VILLAGE OF LE CHAMiBON, AND Hov GOODNESS HAPPENED THERE
(1979).
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describes it, "[a]ffirming common humanity does not mean turning
the other cheek or forgetting what happened. '32 Yet, too much remem-
bering may also be dangerous. The repeated, gruesome violence in the
former Yugoslavia exemplifies how intense, unresolved memories of
past wrongs can fester and then explode. Nonetheless, affirmation of
common humanity both in everyday life and in, at the least, symbolic
public discourse concerning the past may be the necessary precondi-
tions for the genuine redress of grievances, and for making halting
steps toward progress.
CONCLUSION
It remains st-iking how discussions of redress for past wrongs tend
to reflect the particular background of the person trying to make a
specific point or claim. Hardly immune, I thus think in terms of tikkun
olar ("repair of the world")-a remarkable concept that is much in
vogue in contemporary Jewish thought. Often, tikkun olam is invoked
as a kind of traditional shorthand for the ongoing commitment to
social justice. Yet the commitment to tikkun olam is hardly untroubled.
One basic question, for example, revolves around how particular or
universal this Jewish social justice commitment ought to be." Another
issue involves the extent of human agency in getting the world into a
state of disrepair in the past or in being able to help mend the effects
of our human ways for the present and future. Of course, such con-
cerns are hardly unique to Jews. Yet, unsurprisingly, I find cogency and
force in Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel's observations that "[t]he
opposite of freedom is not determinism, but hardness of heart .... ,,4
and that "[t]he demand is not only to respect justice in the sense of
abstaining from doing injustice, but also to strive for it, to pursue it." 5
A repeated refrain in the Talmud is that: "Man must act beyond
the rule of laIv."36 Indeed, it is often acknowledged that one may be a
scoundrel-or even worse-while remaining within the boundaries of
the Torah, of the law. For individuals, as for groups and for govern-
ments, an inescapable challenge within a world full of wrongdoing is
how to affirm common humanity alongside the demands of the law. It
32 MINOW, supra note 6, at 146.
33 See generally TIKKUN OLAI: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN JEWISH THOUGHT AND LAW (David
Shatz et al. eds., 1997).
3 4HESCHEL, supra note 24, at 191.
3 Id. at 207.
36 KIRSHENBAUM, sulpa note 30; MOSHE SILBERG, TALMUDIC LAW AND THE MODERN STATE
61-130 (Marvin S. Wiener ed. & Ben Zion Bokser trans., Burning Bush Press 1973); Sau Berman,
Law and Morality, in THE PRINCIPLES OFJEWIsH LAw 153 (Menachem Elon ed., 1975).
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may be that righteousness can only be reached through law's justice.
Yet, paradoxically, it may also be the case that justice can never be
accomplished without the pursuit of righteousness, actively sought and
lived within the quotidian jurisdictions of the soul.
Martha Minow wisely articulates the essence of the daunting task
that these three articles eloquently assign to us all. The challenge, she
says, is to discover "the path of recollection and affirmation and the
path of facing who we are, and what we would become. '37 Or, as Martin
Luther King, Jr. put the point, "[iun the process of gaining our rightful
place we must not be guilty of wrongful deeds. 3 8 In fact, there may be
no righteous ends-only righteous means. Even without clear bench-
marks, substantial redress still has its claims. We must attend to that
principle if we ever hope to make progress toward the remarkable old
promise of reciprocal freedom.
37 MINOw, supra note 6, at 147.
3 King, supra note 11, at 262.
535

